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CHAPTER I„ INTRODUCTION 
During recent years, considerable research has been directed 
towards establishing the structure-conduct-performance relation­
ships of the commercial banking industry. The term structure 
refers to market characteristics such as the number and size dis­
tribution of sellers aoid buyers, the degree of product differentia­
tion, the existence of beurriers to entry of new firms, aind the ratio 
of fixed to total costs of the firms in an industry. Conduct refers 
to behavioral chaoracteristics such as pricing policies and product 
line strategies. Performance generally refers to the operational 
and allocational efficiency of an industry. Operationaul efficiency 
essentially refers to the degree to vàiich products axe produced 
aind services are generated at least cost. Allocational efficiency 
is the effectiveness by which resources are directed to their alter­
native uses, i.e., resources should be directed to those uses that 
are the most highly vailùed. 
SeveraJ. studies pertaining to the structure-conduct-performance 
relationships of the commercial banking industry have found a signif­
icant relationship between maorket structure vaoriables and various 
measures of bank conduct said performance. For example, George G. 
Kaufman (Kaufman, 1966, p. 438) found that the greater was the num­
ber of banks or the lower was the percentage of deposits held by 
the largest bank the lower were effective interest rates charged on 
loans, the higher were interest rates paid on time deposits, and the 
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greater wais the ratio of time to total deposits. Franklin Edwards 
found a statisticaJ-ly significant positive association between con­
centration in local banking markets, as measured by the percentage 
of totcLL Standard Metropolitan Area deposits held by the lairgest 
three banks in each metropolitan aorea, and the level of interest 
rates charged by banks (Edwaords, 1964, pp. 264-300). DonaJLd R. 
Fraser and Peter S. Rose conducted a study comparing the effects 
of bank entry by hypothesizing that "banks operating in communities 
about to experience the entry of a new bamk have performance char­
acteristics different from a set of bemks similar in size and loca­
tion but not experiencing new competition." They concluded that 
the entry of a new independent bank in the situations analyzed, 
brought about significant changes in the nature of banking services 
offered to the local communities by the established banks (Fraser 
and Rose, 1972, p. 66). 
Although these studies tend to indicate the existence of rela­
tionships among structure, conduct, and performance variables in 
the commercial banking industry, those statistical studies are only 
as valid as the choice of variables used. In particular, the selec­
tion of structural variables tends to be oversimplified. Virtually 
all s true ture-conduc t-p^rformance studies regarding commercial bank­
ing use either the concentration ratio or some variation of the 
concentration ratio, such as the number of banks in a town or 
county as the measure of structure. 
But any concentration measure is only as valid as the maarket 
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definition on viiich it is based. For a concentration measure to 
have meamingful implications, it must be based on a market that is 
economicsLlly relevant, in both a product and geographic sense. Too 
often) markets are defined in a way that facilitates the process of 
data collection, but pays little credence to economic relevance. 
The market areas generally used as the basis for most structure-
conduct-performance studies are more of a political than economic 
nature, e.g., towns, counties, states, etc. There is no reason to 
believe that these political aoreas and economic market areas are 
necessarily coincident. As a consequence, the resulting concentra­
tion measures aaid structure-conduct-performance relationships must 
be viewed with extreme caution. 
The purpose of this study is to construct aoi operational method 
for the delineation of economically relevant geographical banking market 
areats. In a less restrictive sense, the methodology will provide a 
technique for separating or assigning banks into their respective 
market areas. An intermediate objective of the thesis is to develop 
a model vAiich can be used to conpauce the interdependent pricing 
functions for spatially separated banks to those of spatially ad­
jacent banks. The intent of this methodology is to determine the 
impact of geographical sepauration on potentially interdependent 
pricing functions within padrs of banks. Where the inpact of 
geographical separation significantly diminishes the degree of in­
terdependence within pairs of banks, one can establish a basis for 
geographical market area separation. In this manner, geographical 
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market areais can be delineated, and the groundwork can be laid for 
the ceilculation of meaningful measures of concentration. 
Chapter II contaiins a literature review pertaining to the nature 
of banking markets, the choice of structural variables, and the 
existing methods of market aorea delineation. Chapter III outlines 
a theoreticaJL model of market area delineation. The model is first 
given in a static form and then modified to accommodate dynamic sit­
uations. Chaç>ter IV presents a statistical adaptation of the theo-
reticaJL model in order to facilitate empiricaUL testing procedures, 
Chester V consists of a description of the data collection proce­
dure, the calculations performed on the data, and the statistical 
results. Chapter VI presents a summary and conclusions of the study. 
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CHAPTER II o REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Before developing a delineation aqpproach, it is useful to 
describe the nature of the commercial banking industry. Such a 
description provides a framework from which to view related 
structural issues. 
The Nature of the Banking Industry 
A perfectly competitive market can be defined as a free, im­
personal market in which the forces of supply and demand determine 
the allocation of resources. There are essentially four major pre­
requisites necessary for the existence of this type of maxket: 
1. A large number of buyers and sellers 
2. A homogeneous product 
3. Free entry and exit to and from the industry 
4. Perfect knowledge on the behalf of producers and con­
sumers 
The commerciail banking industry fadLls to meet any of these necesssiry 
criteria, smd thus cannot be viewed within the framework of perfect 
competition. The banking industry contains a smaJ-1 number of firms— 
particularly in localized markets. Commercial, banks offer a vaoriety 
of heterogeneous services. Entry into the industry is extremely dif­
ficult. And most consumer and producer decisions are made in the 
absence of perfect knowledge. This lack of competition in commer­
cial banking stems directly from governmentauL control. Because 
society has judged that the "bamking industry is so charged with 
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the public interest that its success or failure cannot be left 
entirely to the principle of competitive survival.", (Fischer, 1968, 
p. 214), steps have been taken to eliminate many elements of price 
competition. This reduction in price competition is a social vadue 
judgment viiich is subject to debate, but for the present time, it 
creates a constraint viiich must be taken as given. The drive to 
eliminate price competition in commercieuL banking has resulted in 
laws that restrict both performance and structure. 
Performance regulations 
Regulations concerning performance constitute a direct attempt 
to preclude price competition in the banking industry. The Federal 
Reserve Act of 1914 as amended states, "No member bank shall direct­
ly or indirectly, by any device whatsoever, pay any interest on any 
deposit which is payable on demaind." In addition, "the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System shall from time to time 
limit, by regulation, the rate of interest which may be paid by 
member banks on time and savings deposits, and shall prescribe 
different rates for such payments on time and savings deposits hav­
ing different maturities" (Controller of the Currency, 1959, pp. 71-
72) . Of course vaxious forms of nonprice competition have airisen 
as a result of these price restrictions. But technically defined, 
this is not "competition," but instead an activity often termed 
"rivalry." Rivalry can be defined as "a striving for potentially 
incompatible positions; combined with a clear av;areness by the 
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parties involved that the positions they seek to attain may be in­
compatible" (Scherer, 1971, p. 9). 
Structural regulations 
Regulatory authorities have proceeded beyond the performance 
level to also closely regulate the structure of the banking industry. 
This has been accomplished by limiting entry into the banking field 
through stringent chartering policies at both federal and state 
levels. Both federail and state criteria for approving a bank char­
ter include the standing of the applicants, the demand for a bank 
in the msorket, and the prospects of its success if it is established. 
A 1964 survey of state bank supervision conducted by the American 
Bankers Association revealed that approximately four-fifths of the 
states had statutes requiring bank charter aç>plicants to provide 
information showing a public need for a bank in a proposed location 
(Fischer, 1968, p. 214). The Joint Economic Committee reported that 
a number of branch applications have been rejected because of the 
"priority of another banks supplication" or that the proposed office 
mi^t be "detrimental to another bank" (Fischer, 1968, p. 217) . 
Finailly, states may attempt to thwart competition further by 
limiting both branch banking and holding conpamies. Because it 
is typically conceded that due to scale economics it is less costly 
to enter a market via a branch thaoi via a unit bank, limits on 
branching become an effective method for controlling any possible 
competition. As of 1973, thirty-four states maintained some form 
of branch banking regulation, either completely prohibiting branch 
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banking or restricting the location of branches to limited areas. 
In summaury, governmental regulations, through restrictive 
structure and performance measures, have preempted a competitive 
mairket structure in the field of commercial banking. As a result, 
a considerable degree of market power has been introduced into the 
banking industry, i.e., the banks have a good deal of discretion 
over output and price within the limits set by the regulatory 
authorities. In a definitional sense, the banking industry can 
be described as oligopolistic. An oligopoly is sai-d to exist when 
more than one seller is in the msurket, but when the number is not 
so large as to render negligible the contribution of each. In some 
specialized cases, it is possible for the oligopolistic market to 
reduce to one of monopoly. An exan^le of this special, case would 
be a situation in vàiich only one bemk is operating in a small and 
isolated maarket. The important point to be emphasized, is that any 
structural measures regarding the banking industry, must be inter­
preted within the context of the existence of market power. Generally 
this market power is exercised through an oligopolistic market. 
Measures of Market Structure 
Virtually all variables used to describe market structure 
measure structure in the form of some type of market concentration 
measure. 
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The concentration ratio 
The most fundamental measure of market concentration is the 
concentration ratio. The concentration ratio is defined as "the 
percentage of total industry sales (or output, or employment, or 
value added, or assets) contributed by the largest firms, ranked 
in order of market shares" (Scherer, 1971, pp. 50-51). Some 
structure-conduct-performance studies attendît to relate levels of 
concentration ratios to various indicators of conduct amd perform-
aunce. Others merely look at the concentration ratios themselves 
as indicators of the existing market structure. These studies im­
plicitly assume that a certaiin level of market concentration yields 
certain prescribed conduct and performance characteristics. 
The concentration table and the Lorenz curve 
An extension of the concentration ratio is the concentration 
table. The concentration table consists of a list of concentra­
tion ratios pertaining to various groups of firms in an industry, 
e.g., the largest four firms, the laargest ei^t firms, etc. This 
provides a more complete description of axi entire industry than does 
the single concentration ratio. A method of summarizing the in­
formation comprising the concentration table is provided by the 
Lorenz curve. The Lorenz curve can be defined as "a curve which 
shows as a continuous function the percentage of totaJ. industry 
sales (or some other variable) accounted for by any given fraction 
of the totcil company population, with the firms ranked in order of 
market share or size" (Scherer, 1971, p. 51). 
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The Herfindahl index 
Another measure of concentration is the Herfindahl index. This 
measure is ceJ.culated by squaring and then summing the market shaores 
pertaining to all firms comprising an industry. When an industry 
consists of only one firm, the Herfindahl index will equal its 
maximum vaJLue of one. As the number of firms in an industry in­
creases, the index will decrease in value. As the degree of in­
equality among a given number of firms increases, the index will 
increase in vaJLue. Thus, the Herfindahl index is an extremely use­
ful measure of concentration in that it reflects both the number 
of firms in an industry and eilso the degree of inequality among 
those firms. 
Appropriate Market Selection 
A major criticism concerning the use of concentration measures 
is the difficulty of defining the relevant market to use in cal­
culating the measures. Essentially there are two aspects to the 
problem. First, the relevant product market must be established, 
and second, the appropriate geographic market axea. must be de­
lineated. 
The product market 
The major issue in determining the appropriate product market 
is obtaining a definition that appropriately allows for the possi­
bilities of substitution. Specifically, in the case of commercial 
banking, the issue is vdiether or not to include other financial 
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intermediaries, e.g., savings and loan associations, credit unions, 
etc. In a legal sense, the courts have excluded other financial 
intermediaories and specifically defined commercial banking to be a 
distinct industry. The Supreme Court has stated; 
. . .  t h a t  t h e  c l u s t e r  o f  p r o d u c t s  ( v a r i o u s  k i n d s  o f  c r e d i t )  
and services (such as checking accounts and trust administra­
tion) denoted by the term "commercial banking" comprises a 
distinct line of commerce. Some commercial banking products 
or services sire so distinctive that they are entirely free 
of effective coinpetition from products or services of other 
financial institutions; the checking account is in this 
category. Others enjoy such cost advantages as to be in­
sulated within a broad ramge from substitutes furnished by 
other institutions. ... Finally, there aire banking 
facilities vAiich although in terms of cost and price aire 
freely competitive with the facilities provided by other 
financial institutions, nevertheless, enjoy a settled con­
sumer preference, insulating them to a marked degree, from 
coz^etition; this seems to be the case with savings deposits. 
In sum, it is clear that commercial banking is a market, 
sufficiently inclusive to be meaningful in teims of trade 
realities (U.S. vs. Philadelphia National. Bank, 1963, 374 
U.S. 321, 356-357, and 326, N.S.). 
The commercial banking industry is considered a separate and dis­
tinct line of commerce due to the fact that it offers such a multi­
tude of financial services. Other financial intermediaories, on the 
other hand, aire limited to only a few specialized services, thus 
losing any spillover benefits from one service to ainother. 
Regarding the Philadelphia case, the Supreme Court cited the 
testimony of a savings amd loan official viio stated that "for fifty 
yeaurs or more in his area the mutual, savings banks had offered an 
interest rate one-half percent or more hi^er than that paid by com­
mercial banks, yet, the rate of increase in savings accounts in 
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commercial banks had kept pace with (aind in some cases exceeded) 
the rate of increase of deposits in mutual savings banks." Tradi­
tional price theory would suggest that prices (or interest rates) 
within a competitive market should tend toward equality. This 
sustained interest rate differential between commercial banks and 
savings and loan associations implies a low degree of product sub­
stitution. In keeping with the conventional interpretation of the 
uniqueness of commercial banking, it is assumed in this study that 
the commercial banking industry constitutes a separate and distinct 
product market. 
The geographic maorket 
The second aspect of the problem of proper market selection 
is the difficulty associated with establishing the relevant geo­
graphic marmet. The concept of an economic market area cam be de­
fined as "the area encompassing all those economic units that exert 
and react to essentially the same set of competitive forces in­
fluencing the price emd quaJLity of a specific product or service" 
(Classman, 1973, p. 21), or as "a geographic region in which supply 
and demand forces differ from those in an adjacent area and within 
vdîich, therefore, prices tend toward the same value while not neces­
sarily tending toward the same value as those in an adjacent area" 
(Classman, 1973, p. 19). This definition of a market provides not 
only a base for determining market concentration measures, but it 
also can be used to determine the relationship between concentration 
measures sind relevant performance variables. Unfortunately, most 
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concentration measures presently applied to the commercial bank­
ing industry may be inappropriate due to improper definition of the 
relevant market area. 
Most msurket areas used as a base for concentration measure cal­
culations are chosen on the basis of e3q>edience rather than economic 
relevance. GeneratLly, politicaJ. sireas such as the nation, the state, 
or the county, axe chosen as proxies for economic market areas. But 
there is very little reason, even at an intuitive level, to confirm 
the validity of these assumed relationships. There is a disparity 
of economic and social conditions not only across political axeas 
but within them as well. 
In addition, there exists a heterogeneous set of governmental 
regulations across states concerning the behavior and structure of 
the banking industry. Throughout the nation and each state, in­
terest rates aire fax from homogeneous—implying the existence of 
markets on a much smaller geographic level. The county, on the 
other hand, may represent an area that is economicauLly too small— 
often excluding additional economicaJLly homogeneous territory. 
Existing Geographicail Delineation Procedures 
A relevant geographic market area cannot be chosen arbitraorily. 
Instead it must be delineated on the basis of economic considerations. 
Unfortunately most of the delineation techniques currently in use 
result in the construction of trade aoreas rather than market areas. 
These two concepts must be distinguished. 
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As defined previously, a market eirea is "the axea. encompassing 
aJ.1 those economic units that exert and react to essentially the 
same set of competitive forces influencing the price and quality of 
a specific product or service" (Glassman, 1973, p. 21)- This con­
cept is to be distinguished from a trade axea. which can be defined 
as "a geographically delineated region, containing potential cus­
tomers for whom there exists a probability greater than zero of 
their purchasing a given class of products or services offered for 
sale by a particular firm or by a particular agglomeration of firms" 
(Huff, 1964, p. 38). 
Note that the trade aurea definition says nothing of "competi­
tive forces." The trade axea, in essence, outlines the potential 
customer area for a particulao: firm or group of firms and ususLLly is 
based upon such chaoracteristics as transportation costs, town size, 
or price differentials. A maurket axea, on the other hand, is not 
defined to identify particular customers or aireas of customers, but 
rather, to identify those firms that are reacting to similar competi­
tive forces. As such, a trade area can be viewed as a subset within 
the mairket area. A market area will contain at least one and, often 
several trade areas. Although the trade area must not be confused 
with the maorket axea, it is of some indirect benefit in the actual 
construction of mairket axea boundaries. 
Trade axea delineation 
The methodology of trade area delineation can be divided into 
two major categories—empirical and theoretical. 
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Empirical techniques This category of trade area delineation 
includes such methods as "customer spotting" and "license plate analy­
sis." Customer spotting involves a series of customer interviews at 
the place of business. These interviews obtain information on the 
address of the customer to relate business location to customer loca­
tion. In license plate analysis, license plate numbers of customer 
cars in the relevsmt businesses* parking lot are recorded to deter­
mine the extent of the trade aocea. (Markin, 1971, pp. 195-196). 
Gravitationail method The gravitational, method, developed 
by Reilly and modified by Converse and Huegy, is the foremost 
theoretical technique for trade area delineation. Essentiailly, for 
two towns, A and B, the Reilly model can be specified as; 
Mg is the breaking point between towns A auid B (distance from B) 
D is the distemce between towns A and B 
is the population of town A 
Pg is the population of town B 
(Markin, 1971, pp. 192-193). 
The trade area of a firm is thus a function of the distance from its 
customers and also the size of the town in vdiich it is located. This 
formula has been modified in some instances to use driving time in 
place of distance and/or firm size instead of town population. These 
D 
viiere: 
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are useful modifications in the sense that distance is only a proxy 
for driving time which is in turn a proxy for the cost of trans­
portation. 
The economic law of maorket areas Another theoretical ap­
proach to trade area delineation is that developed under the so-called 
"economic law of market areas," vAiich states: 
The boundary line between the territories tributary to 
two geographically competing maorkets for like goods is a 
hypercircle. At each point on this curve the difference 
between freight costs from the two markets is just equaJL to 
the difference between the market prices whereas on either 
side of this line the freight differences and the price 
differences are unequal. The ratio of the price difference 
to the freight rate, and the ratio of the freight rates from 
the two maarkets, determine the location of the boundary line; 
the higher the relative price, aoid the lower the relative 
frei^t rate, the larger the tribu tor y axea. (Hyson smd Hyson, 
1950, pp. 319-327). 
Mathematicailly, 
(1) p + r PA = q + s PB 
where: 
A and B axe two fixed markets 
P is an external consuming point 
PA is the distamce between P and A 
PB is the distauice between P emd B 
p is the mairket price of the commodity at A 
q is the market price of the commodity at B 
r is the freight rate between P and A 
s is the freight rate between P and B 
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By reacrranging terms, 
(2) PÂ - "I PB = ^ ^  P 
and 
(3) ^  - h PB = ± k 
vAiere: 
^  = f  
and 
+ k = ~ •P vdien ~ ^ > O 
r r 
- k = ^ "• ^  vAien ^ ^ ^  < 0 
This approach has two important advantages over the gravita­
tional technique. First, it considers any existing freight rate 
differentials. Regarding the commercial banking industry, freight 
rates are replaced by customer travel and transaction costs. The 
consideration of this variable becomes very important where a road 
structure becomes heterogeneous. Second, the economic law of market 
areas takes account of any price differentials between competing 
firmso As a consequence, it can be used to construct trade area. 
boundaries for firms composing any type of meirket structure—includ­
ing an oligopolistic market structure, such as commercial banking, 
vfeere sustained price differentials may exist. 
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In simmary, the techniques for trade aorea delineation aire use­
ful for identifying the particular customers of individual firms. 
More iaçxjrtantly they identify the geographicaLLly marginal customers 
on vàiich a firm's pricing decisions are often based. But their use 
cannot be extended further. They provide little insight into the 
construction of geograi±iic market areas. 
Market area delineation 
The foremost conceptual, method of market area delineation is 
the cross-price elasticity concept. This is a measure of performance 
vÈiich can be interpreted to yield structural implications. Specifi­
cally, the cross-price elasticity is defined as: 
This cross-price elasticity takes into account a "total effect" Wbich 
considers both the substitution and income effects resulting from a 
price change. 
Ao G. Papaaidreou and J. T, Wheeler (1954, pp. 20-39) outlined 
>4iere; 
is the cross-price elasticity variable 
dQj is the change in firm j's output 
dP^ is the change in firm i's price 
P^ is the originaJ. price maintained by firm i 
Qj is the original quantity of output produced by firm j 
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a procedure for maorket delineation that is based on cross-demand 
schedules between firms. They concluded that two products aire sub­
stitutes and the firms producing those products aire in the same 
market vtoenever the cross-demand curve for their products is posi­
tively sloped. If, however, the cross-demand curve between two 
firms is nonincreasing, the firms faill into separate maorkets. Under 
these specifications, the general concept of a banking market defined 
above can be modified to be "a region in viiich the cross elasticity 
of demand for banking services between banks within the region is 
significantly higher than that existing between banks in the region 
and banks outside the region" (Glassmaji, 1973, p. 22). 
The cross-price elasticity relates the percentage change in 
dQ. 
one firm. • to the pér­
dP. S 
firm, 
^i 
it is assumed 
that tastes, nominsJ. incomes, and other product prices—including 
the price of firm j—remain constant. When > 0, the products 
are determined to be substitutes and the firms are subject to com­
mon maorket demand forces. In other words, the firms aure not isolated 
from each other. This would seem to indicate the existence of 
either competitive or oligopolistic firms. If E. . 0, the firms 
auce not subject to common maorket demand forces. The firms act as 
isolated sellers—at least with respect to each other. This could 
indicate the existence of an isolated monopoly, if adl the cross-
price elasticities for a particular firm in an area equal zero. 
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Althou^ theoretically açjpeaJLing, cross-price elasticities are 
difficult to implement (Cochrane, 1957, pp. 21-39). Often the 
necessairy price-quantity data needed to estimate cross-demamd 
schedules do not exist. Even if the data were available, the 
cost of estimating cross-demand schedules between auLl firms would 
be prohibitive. In addition, the isolated and static nature of 
the cross-price elasticity concept can create problems of inter­
pretation. In the real world, incomes and prices do not hold con­
stant for the purposes of measurement. As changes, often so 
does P.. In a perfectly competitive environment, P. = P.. The rea-j 1 J 
son is that perfectly competitive firms are by definition price 
takers and consequently charge uniform prices that are established 
in the maorket place. For simileir reasons c3P^ = dP^. Also, be­
cause dP^ = dPj, dQj = 0, amd -» O, instead of > 0 as in­
dicated eairlier. In em oligopolistic industry such as commercial 
banking there axe also problems of interpretation. Again if P^ = 
Pj and dP^ - dP^, then dQ^ = O and E^^ -> 0, and little insight is 
provided. 
An oligopolistic market, by nature, consists of interdependent 
firms. Price and output decisions sure made under the recognition 
of similar decisions being made by rivals» This being the case, 
one would expect that dP^ might equal dPj and hence E^^. -> 0 would 
indicate the presence of nonisolation, rather than the isolation 
that was previously indicated. To clarify the matter, it is neces­
sary to develop a method of approximating the elements of inter­
dependence that are the result of oligopolistic rivalry. These 
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elements of interdependence are called reaction functions and con­
jectural variations. In a world consisting of two firms, firm i and 
firm j, the reaction function of firm i is defined as how firm i 
dP. 
will respond to a price change initiated by firm j, i.e., 
The conjectural, variation as perceived by firm i, is defined as 
how firm i thinks firm j will respond to firm i's own price ini-
dP. 
tiative, i.e., It will be the purpose of the next chapter to 
construct a model for meurket delineation based on these variables. 
In sunmary, the commercial baulking industry has been described 
as oligopolistic in nature. The structural measure most often used 
to estimate the degree of oligopoly is generally some measure of 
concentration. But a vaJ.id concentration measure must be based on 
an economicsLLly defined market area which is relevant to the par­
ticular firms under consideration. >&)st of the so-called market 
area delineation techniques currently in use, effectively delineate 
trade aireas rather than market areas. They identify each firm's 
particular set of customers, rather thain construct an aorea that 
is subject to common maurket forces. Cross elasticities are theoreti-
caJ.ly appealing, but are virtually impossible to implement. 
The model developed in the next chapter will be designed with 
am applicability to oligopolistic market structures such as commer-
ciauL banking. The long-range intent of the model is to lay the 
groundwork for the caulculation of meaningful concentration measures. 
This should prove useful regaurding amy future ainalysis of the "com­
petitive" environment in banking, the operational and allocational 
21b 
efficiency of the banking system, and policy prescriptions for 
structural change in the banking industry» 
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CHAPTER III. A THEORY OF BANK 
INPUT PRICE RESPONSE 
The theoretical, model to be constructed is an oligopsony model, 
or more specifically in the two bank case, a duopsony model, from 
Tdiiich reaction functions between two potentially rival banks can 
be developed. A reaction function is defined as a function that 
relates the price or quzmtity of one firm as a function of the price 
or quantity, respectively, of another firm. In other words, the 
interdependent pricing or output policies of the two firms are 
specified. Specifically, in the model to be presented, the reaction 
functions are of the price-price form, Wiere the prices sire repre­
sented by the input prices paid by each bank. 
Mathematical Constructs 
Mathematiccil models are constructed for both spaceless and 
spatial cases. In both models, deposits are treated as inputs to 
the banks, vàiere the depositors, or the suppliers of inputs, are 
treated as atomistic in nature. The banks on the other hand axe 
treated as oligopsonistic, and consequently face upward sloping in­
put (deposit) supply curves. Since it is not the objective of the 
model to examine the oul^jut side of the maorket, output prices are 
assumed to be determined exogenously. 
There are seversJ. additional assumptions that axe prerequisite 
to the model construction. First, the banks behave as profit maxi­
mizing firms. Profit maximization is assumed rather than the more 
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generaJ. rule of utility maximization for the purpose of simplifica­
tion. Second, the "Coumot assumptions," that the conjecturaJL var­
iations are equal to zero, are recognized. Third, there can be no 
price discrimination based on geographical location, i.e., a 
firm cannot vairy its input price as a function of the distance 
between the customer and the point of production. For example, 
it might be in a firm's interest to pay higher input prices 
to customers located on the outer fringe of its trade area. In 
this manner, the firm could expaind the size of its geographical 
trade area. There is no evidence, however, that the commercial 
bsmking industry engages in the practice of geographical price 
discrimination. Fourth, for simplification, any possible inter­
action effects between the input and the output sides of the market 
are ignored. Specifically the bank's customers may be both deposi­
tors and loan recipients. It may be possible that the actueJ. input 
price paid out by the bank to its customers should take into account 
the availability of future loans to these same customers (Luckett, 
1970, pp. 420-434). 
The spaceless case 
The spaceless case exists viien distance is not a factor in the 
model. Transportation costs are assumed to be equal to zero, i.e., 
cill production is assumed to take place at a point in space. The 
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duopsony model rests on the assumption that there are only two 
buyers of iiç)uts. These two buyers shall be designated as bank 
one and bank two. The aggregate input supply functions correspond­
ing to bank one and bank two can be represented as; 
(1) = fi(W^,Wg) 
and 
(2) *2 = 
where 
= total inputs (deposits) offered to bank one 
Xg = totsil inputs (deposits) offered to bank two 
= ii^ut price paid by bank one 
Wg = input price paid by bank two 
It is assumed that 
bX bX 5X bX 
i.e., the amount of input (deposits) supplied to each bemk is 
directly related to its own input price and inversely related to 
its rival* s iiç>ut price. 
The possibility of interdependent pricing is taJcen into account 
by including both input prices in each banks aggregate input supply 
function. The possibility of some degree of product differentiation 
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is considered by giving each bank's aggregate input supply function 
a different notationaX form. This product differentiation may be 
either real or perceived. Often, in the case of commercial banking, 
it may be in the form of some type of customer loyailty to a paorticu-
lar bank. %e existence of product differentiation explains the 
potential for sustained input price differentials in the spaceless 
case. 
The production functions of banks one and two cam be notation-
ally written as: 
(3) = F^(X^) 
and 
(4) 02 = 
where 
= quantity of oulput (loans or investments) of bank one 
Qg ~ quantity of output (loans or investments) of bank two 
The production functions show each bank's amount of output to be a 
function of its amount of input, i.e., each baink's amount of loans 
or investments is a function of its level of deposits. 
The profit maximizing equations for each baink cam be written 
as: 
(5) TT^ = - b^ 
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and 
(6) "2 = % - % - "2 
where 
TT^ = profits of bank one 
TTg = profits of bank two 
b^ = some level of fixed costs for bank one 
bg = some level of fixed costs for bank two 
Specifically, the profit level for each bank is equaJL to the dif­
ference of the total revenue (P*Q) and the total variable cost 
(W*X), less the level of fixed cost (b^ or b^) . Substituting equa­
tions (3) and (4) into equations (5) and (6) respectively yields: 
(7) TT^.= PjF^(X^) -
and 
(8) ITj = PgFgPg) - - bg 
Substituting equations (1) and (2) into equations (7) and (8) re­
spectively yields: 
(9) TT^ = P^F^[f^(W^,W2)] - W^f^(W^,W2) - b^ 
and 
(10) #2 = P^F^CfgCWj.W^)] - - bg 
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The profit maximizing conditions, or reaction functions, for banks 
one and two axe determined by taking the total derivative of each 
bank's profit level (TT^ and TT^) with respect its input price (W^ 
and Wg) respectively. For bank one: 
dTT , bf, dW, bp, bf, 
'1 " ''•^1 ""1 "'"l " ""1 ""2 ^"1/ 
(11) ——1 = p 1 + p —.1 —1 L— 
I J dW, 1 bf, bw, dW, ^1 bf, bw„ IdW, 
bf dW bf /dW-N dW 
- "i Swj di^ - "i 5(5;!^- dw^ = ° 
The output price, P, is assumed to be determdLned exogenously, and 
therefore is treated as constant. Ansilogously, for bank two: 
dTT _ bp bf /dW.f bp bf dW-
^ > -âÇ= 2b^bw;;(^l* 2bf^b^^ 
bf /dw\* bf dWg dw 
- «2 5w^(^)- "2 5»; di^ - ^2<"l'"2> âg = ° 
Because equation (11) is the profit maximizing equation for bank 
one, the conjectural variation is represented by This repre­
sents how beink one believes bank two will respond to bank one's own 
price initiative. Equation (12) is the profit maximizing equation 
for bank two. The conjectural vairiation in that equation is repre-
s en ted by This represents how bank two believes bank one will 
respond to bank two's own price initiative. In accord with the 
Cournot assumptions, the conjectural variations are set equeJ. to 
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zero and equations (11) and (12) reduce to; 
dTT . bp bf bf 
(13) "âÇ = ^ 1 5^ bï^ - «1 5w^ - = ° 
dTi, bp bf- bf, 
(14) "âÇ = ''z 5f; big - "2 big - ^ 2("i'"2) = ° 
In order to determine how these profit maximizing conditions for 
each bamk change with respect to an input price change initiated 
by the rivsJ. bank, it is necessary to take the total differential 
of equations (13) and (14). For bank one: 
bF bf bf b^F bf b^F 
bf^ bw^ ^ 1 * ^ 1 bf^bw^ ^^1 * ^ 1 bw^ bf^bw^ ^ 2 
bF b& bF b^f bV 
"1 "x 
" ^1 bw^bwg ^2 " ^  bW^ ^ 1 " bWg ^ 2 " ° 
Analogously for bsmk two: 
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b F  £ > f  à f  d %  à f  à \  
bF b% bF b^f b^F 
* ^2 bf^ bWgbW^ ^ 1 ^2 bf^ ^^2 ~ ^2 bWgbW^ ^ *1 
()% Ofg ^^2 
- ^ 2 ^  ^2 - 2 bw; ^ 2 - bw;; = ° 
dW^ dWg 
Equations (15) and (16) can be solved for the ratios and •^jj-
respectively. For bank one: 
bF^ bf^ dP^ bf^ b^F^ 
bf^ bW^  * ^1 b^ bf^bWg 
(17) 
dW^ 
bF, b^f 
+ p 
1 bf^ bw^bwg " ^1 bW^bWg " bW, 
bf2 b% 
" ^1 bW^ bf^bW^ " ^1 bf 
bF b^f b^f bf 
For bank two: 
30 
bfg bWg dw^ * 2 bWg 
+ P 
bF^ b% 
2 bfj bWg&Wi 
dW. 
(13) d5r = 
- w, 2 bwgbw^ 
bf. 
- F 
bf^ b% 
2 bWg bfgbWg 
bFg b% b% bfj 
Equations (17) and (18) represent the slopes of the input price— 
input price reaction functions for banks one and two respectively. 
It should be emphasized that these ratios are not conceptually the 
dWg dW^ 
same as the conjecturaJ. variations, and pertaining to bank 
one and bank two, respectively, that were previously set equal to 
dW^ dWg 
zero in equations (11) and (12). The ratios ^  and show how 
each bank must change its profit maximizing input price in response 
to aai input price change by the other bamk—provided the bazik in­
tends to keep its profits at a maximum. The signs associated with 
dW^ dWg 
the ratios, and are ambiguous from a theoretical perspective. 
It would require an empiricsul estimation of the cross effects com­
prising the ratios to establish their appropriate signs. The im­
portant point to be recognized in the spaceless case, is that each 
bank's input supply function is a function of its rival's input 
price as well as its own input price. Thus any cross effects such 
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as ' , etc. are direct, i.e., any iiç>ut price changes 
initiated by beink two affect bank one's profit maximizing equation 
directly through baoak two's input price vaoriable. The reason the 
input prices enter the input supply functions in this manner is 
that in the spaceless case the banks sire competing for the same 
set of geographical customers. Barring product differentiation, 
there is a zero sum game between the two banks in that one bank's 
loss is the other's gain. The model does, however, recognize the 
existence of some degree of product differentiation—at least as 
perceived by the bank's customers. As a consequence, there may be 
some disparity between the irçjut prices paid out by the banks—even 
dW^ dWg 
in this spaceless case. As a result, the ratios and may 
deviate from the value one at some points in time. 
The spatial case 
The spatieJ. case extends the spaceless aoialysis by including 
distance or customer location as a factor in the model, i.e., the 
analysis is essentially the same, but it has been generaulized to 
allow for transportation costs (Greetihut, Greenhut, amd Kelly, 1977, 
pp. 210-253). It is necessary to impose two additional assumptions 
for the spatial case. First, the customers are assumed to be evenly 
or uniformly distributed between the two banks in the model. Second, 
the customers are assumed to be of equal size. These assumptions are 
made to facilitate the aggregation of individual input supply func­
tions. 
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As a consequence, the aggregate input supply functions for 
banks one and two can be written as; 
(19) 
(20) Xj = f2(W2,T2) 
vôiere 
= amount of inputs (deposits) supplied to bank one 
Xg = amount of inputs (deposits) supplied to bank two 
= the input price paid out by bank one 
Wg = the input price paid out by bank two 
= the maximum customer distaince from bank one in terms of 
dollars 
Tg = the maximum customer distance from bank two in terms of 
dollars 
It is assumed that 
bX bX bx bx 
o, 0, j5-> o, 0, 
i.e., the amount of inputs (deposits) supplied to each bank is 
directly related to its own input price and also is directly related 
to the size of its own customer area. For example, by raising its 
input price, a bamk can increase its supply of inputs both by drawing 
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new customers into the market from its own trade surea, aind by cap­
turing some of its rival * s customers by e3q>anding its effective 
trade surea boundaary. It should be noted that bank two's input 
price, Wg, does not enter bank one*s aggregate input supply function 
directly. Similarly bank one's input price, W^, does not enter bank 
two's aggregate input stç>ply function directly. Instead, each bank's 
input price affects the other's aggregate input supply function 
indirectly via the vsiriables and T^. Effectively and rep­
resent the trade aorea boundary, in one dimension space, viewed from 
banks one and two respectively, i.e, is the distance in dollars 
from bank one to the demarcation line between the two banks. Simi-
leorly, is the distance in dollars from bank two to the demarcation 
line. The demarcation line establishes the trade aireas or geographi-
cail customer areas for the two banks. The value of is calculated 
by multiplying the distance, in miles, between bcink one smd the de­
marcation line by the total cost of transportation per mile. Con­
sequently, the resulting value of is expressed in terms of dollars. 
Tg is calculated in the same mamner (Greenhut, Greenhut, and Kelly, 
1977, pp. 210-253). 
Because the distance between the two banks is fixed, 
(21) + Tg = K 
where 
K = the fixed amount of distance in dollar terms between the 
two banks. 
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Equation (21) can be solved for T^: 
(22) Tg = K -
The demarcation line is variable, however, dependent on the input 
prices paid by the two banks. Therefore; 
(23) T^ = g(w^,W2) 
where 
bT 5T-
0 0. 
In other words, as bank one raises its input price, W^, it tends to 
increase the size of its trade area T^. Conversely, as bank two 
raises its input price, W^, it tends to increase the size of its 
own trade axea T^ or decrease the size of bank one's trade area 
T^, since T^ + T^ = K. Substituting equation (23) into equation 
(22) yields: 
(24) Tg = K - g(W^,W2) 
The production functions for the two banks are defined in the same 
manner as for the spaceless case: 
(25) = F^(X^) 
and 
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(26) Qg = Pg(X2) 
The initial profit equations for the two banks aire defined as 
before: 
(27) TT^ = - b^ 
asid 
(28) TTg = PgOg - - bj 
Substituting for and in equations (27) and (28) yields; 
(29) = PiF^(X^) - - b^ 
and 
(30) Hg = PjF^CX^) - - bg 
Substituting for X^ and X^ in equations (29) and (30) yields: 
(31) TT^ = P^F^[f^(W^,T^)] - W^f^(Wj^,T^) - b^ 
and 
(32) - b. 
Substituting for and in equations (31) and (32) yields: 
(33) TT^ = PiFjf^[W^,g(W^,W2)3} - W^f^[W^,g(W^,W2)] -
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and 
(34) TTg = - g(W^,W2)3} - WgfgCWg^K - g{V^yV^)l 
- ^ 2 
To obtain the profit maximizing conditions for the two banks, 
it is necessary to take the total derivative of equations (33) and 
(34) with respect to and Wg respectively. Since the Cournot 
assuîEÇJtions are to be utilized, it is possible to obtaiin the simpli­
fied profit maximizing conditions by partial differentiation of equa­
tions (33) and (34) with respect to W- and W„ respectively. In 
dW^ dWg 
other words, the conjectural variations, and have been 
eliminated by treating constant in equation (33) and by treating 
constant in equation (34). The resulting profit maximizing equa­
tion for bank one is: 
ÔTT 5F 5f 5F 5f- . bf 
(35) bïÇ= f 1 5^ ïf^ 55" 5»^ " "i 5w^ 
- "l W ^  • 
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For bank two the profit maximizing equation is: 
(36) bWg 2 bfg bWg 2 bf^ ôg bWg 2 ÔW^ 
To examine the effect of a change in the rived, input price for 
each bajik (dW^ for bank one and dW^ for bank two), it is necessary 
to totally differentiate equations (35) and (36) and ad.gebraically 
dW^ dWg 
solve for the ratios and respectively. These ratios rep­
resent the slope of the input price-input price reaction functions 
for the two banks. For bank one: 
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bF^ bf^ dP^ 
bf^ bW^ âfg * ^ 1 bW, bf7bT~ bwi 
1 bf^ bw^bT^ bWg bf^ bg bw^ dw^ 
+ P 
bV bf, 
+ p. 1 b< 
bV 
1 bg bw^ bfj^bw^ 1 bg bw^ bf^bT^ bw^ 
1 b< + P !LL ^  
1 bf^ bw^ bgbT^ W"2 
b&. 
+ W. ^ _ 1 bw^bT^ bWg w. 
bw.
b< 
+ P !l2:Î£l.A_ 1 bf^ bg bW^bWg 
b^f. 
1 bw^ bgbT^ bWg 
(37) 
dW^ _ w IFL. M 1 bg bW^bW^ bg bw. 
- P 
bf^ b\ 
1 bw^ bf^bw^ 
. p  î l i Û i  
1 bW^ bf^bT^ aw^ 1 bf^ J,„^2 
.p 
1 bf^ bw^bw^ bW^ 
_p 5 ^  b^F i- ±s_ 
1 bg bW^ bf^bT^ bw^ 
bF 
- P 1 b< 
b^f. bF b^f 
^ i ±2. 
1 bf^ bw^ bgbw^ 1 bf^ bW^ bgbT^ bw^ - P 
. p^ ^ ^ A - W .  2 bf^ bg bw. 
Ù i . «  
1 1 bW^bT^ bW, 
bV 
+ IFI + ^FI±2_ + w  ^ 2 
bW^ bg bW^ 1 bw^ bgbW^ + W 
As. ^ 
1 bW^ bgbT^ bw^ 
1 »« bw/ 
Analogously, for bank 2: 
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bfg OWg dw^ " 2 bw^ bfgbTg bw^ 
"^2 "% ao 2l2!f2±S.f2 
" 2 bfg bWgbTg bw^ " bfg bg bWg dw^ 
+ p P !l2^ ±&. 
2 bg bWg bfgbTg bw^ 2 bfg bWg bgbTg bw^ 
" 2 bfg bg bw^bw^ 2 bw^bT^ 5^ 
b^f^ ^ 6f ^2 bf. 
- w, 2_-^ + W —^ 9 _ 2 bWg bgbTg bw^ 2 bg bw^bw^ bT^ bw^ 
. ^^2 , "^2 C% (,. _ ="^2"% 
2 AWg 2 bWj SfgôTj bWj - 2bf2j,„^2 
2 bfg bWgbTg bWg ^^2 bg bw^ bf^bw^ 
. p # + P.^^ 
2 5g &Wg bfgATg bWg 2 afg aWg agbWj 
. p !l2^2!î2_^*p Î!2Î!2^ 
2 Afg aWg ôgbTj SWg 2 bf^ bg ^^^2 
- «2 ^  - "2 bi^ bt * 5i^ - ^  4 
2 2 
M ^ ^2 bg ^ ^2 bg 
2 bWg bgbWg 2 Fw^ bgbTg 
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AgaJji, as in the spaceless case, the signs associated with the 
dWi dWg 
ratios, and are ambiguous from the perspective of economic 
theory. An empiricaJL estimation of the cross effects comprising 
the ratios is needed to establish their appropriate signs. The 
point to be reeJ-ized frcm the spatisil case is that a change in a 
bank's input price affects the slope of the rival's reaction func­
tion by way of the trade area boundary—represented by the variables 
and T^. The slope of bamk one's reaction function is given by 
equation (37). It can be seen that any change in the rivaJL bank's 
input price, W^, aiffects the terms in equation (37) through the 
cross partiéil Equation (23) was: 
Il = 9(Wi, Wj) 
bTi . 
Therefore, rrr- = Also since rrr" was assumed to be negative, 
OWg OWg OWg 
so must » Descriptively, as bank two increases its input 
price, Wg, it tends to push the trade area boundeury out towaurds 
bank one. As a consequence, bank one's trade area boundaory, T^, 
declines and so does the amount of deposits, X^, supplied to bank 
one. As a consequence, bamk one is forced to make a price revision 
if it is to maintain a profit maximizing position. Any analysis 
pertaiining to the slope of bank two's reaction function is analogous. 
The point of difference between the spatial and spaceless 
cases is the degree of impact one rival has on another, i.e., the 
degree of impact is totaJL in the spaceless case barring product 
41 
differentiation. The reason for this is that the spaceless rivals 
axe competing for the same set of geographical customers. Regard­
ing the spatial case, this is only partly true. The spatial rivals 
only compete directly for their geograç>hicaJ.ly maorginad. customers. 
The nonmarginal customers, in a geographicad sense, are figura­
tively "locked in" to each respective bank*s trade area by trans­
portation costs. As a consequence, the spatial banks' price reac­
tions may not be so extensive as for the spaceless banks. This is 
paxticulaarly in reference to price changes that are initiated by 
internal factors, e.g., increased efficiency on the pairt of one 
of the banks. It is realized that changes in common exogenous 
paurameters (common maarket forces) will cause similar price reac­
tions by the affected banks. 
The element of geographical sepaoration can become even more 
pronounced when the assumption of a uniform customer distribution 
is relaxed. To the extent that there might exist areas of sparsely 
populated land between two potential rivals, coupled with the fact 
that price changes are generally not infinitesimally small, the 
geographical market sepairation may be complete. 
From these theoretical models it is possible to hypothesize 
that one can delineate, or at the least, assign banks to their 
respective geographic banking maorkets by examining the extent of 
the reaction functions between potentially rival banks. The 
crucial assumption prerequisite to the empirical, analysis in the 
following chapter, is that the spaceless bamks a priori constitute 
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a population of rivaJ. banks. Technically the term "rivaJLry" is 
defined as "the striving for potentially incompatible positions, 
combined with a cleair avareness by the parties involved, that the 
positions they se^ to attain may be incompatible" (Scherer, p. 9). 
It is implicit, that the degree of product differentiation is not 
so great as to classify the spaceless banks in different markets. 
Theoretically, the magnitude of the slopes of the reaction func­
tions for these spaceless or rival banks can be compared to the 
magnitude of the slopes of the reaction functions for the spatially 
located banks. Thus, it is theoretically possible to determine the 
impact of distance on the slopes of the reaction functions. Where 
the impact is significant, or where the reaction function slopes of 
spatisLl banks significantly differ from those for the spaceless or 
rivcd. banks, one can conclude that the spatially located banks axe 
not behaving as rivals ctnd consequently operate in different market 
areas. 
A Revised Interpretation of the 
Reaction Functions 
The reaction function measures that have been presented have 
been developed in a static context. Tliere are two major problems 
associated with using a static analysis. First, it is necessary 
to assume either that price adjustments are instantsmeous or that 
sufficient time is allowed to elapse such that a complete adjustment 
caoi occur. ReaJ-isticaily, v&iere significant information and decision 
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lags exist, a baoik may make a series of adjustments in response 
to a rival's price change. These intermediate adjustment prices 
are not recognized in a static analysis. 
The second major problem associated with using a static ansuLy-
sis is the selection of the appropriate time unit. In other words, 
it is necessaary to use price changes per unit of time, as the 
measurement variables. The selection of the appropriate time unit, 
however, can be quite difficult. It may be possible to select a 
unit of time that is too long, resulting in relatively homogeneous 
price levels—even for nonrivail banks. A time unit that is too 
long might allow for exogenous parameters to change, consequently 
affecting a change in the endogenous variable. If this is the 
case, then any differences in reactions might be meaningless. 
An alternative measure of firm interdependence that is sensi­
tive to dynamic price adjustments would help to circumvent these 
two major problems. In a dynamic framework, the price reaction 
function can be evsuluated by investigating the response time 
function -~T~» *iiere dt, is the amount of time elapsed between any 
aWg 
change in the price of bank one, and a change in the price of bank 
two. The response time incorporates the use of sJ.1 price adjust­
ments, viiether or not they are market clearing. Also, consideration 
is given to the timing of a price response. PinaLLly, the dynamic 
framework avoids the problem of making any arbitrary time unit 
selections. 
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Due to its con^lexity, a dynamic model shall not be developed 
here. The economic intuition associated with the static and dynamic 
models is essentially the same, as fax as it pertains to this study. 
Consequently, the dynamic framework shsJLl be viewed only as a 
practical modification of the static analysis presented previously. 
In the absence of search costs, information or decision lags, 
and product differentiation, response time will be either zero or 
infinite. If the two banks are rivals, one will respond immediately 
to a price action by the other—response time will be zero. If the 
two bamks are nonrivals, bank one will never respond to price action 
by bank two—response time will be infinite. 
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CHAPTER IV. AN EMPIRICAL ADAPTATION 
OF THE THEORETICAL MOE®L 
Observed Versus TheoreticaJL Response Times 
Althou^ the dynamic theory elaborated in the preceding chapter 
implies that the response time of one bank to another will be either 
zero or infinite, in reaJLity, it can be expected that response times 
will be nonzero but finite. For two rivails, price reactions may 
not be instantaneous for two reasons. First, there may be some de­
gree of product differentiation—not so much as to classify the 
two banks in different markets—but enou^ to yield different in­
put supply curves for the two banks. In other words, because of 
some degree of product differentiation, a bank may have a cushion 
agadnst another* s price initiative, and consequently may not react 
instemtaneously. Second, there may be information or decision lags. 
If bank one changes its price, it may be some time before bank two 
is aware of that change. Or, even if bank two immediately discovers 
the change in bank one's pricing policy, the decision process may 
result in a delay before bemk two can implement its own price 
changes» Thus, it is likely that for rivals, the response time 
will be nonzero. 
Likewise, even for two nonrivals, it is unlikely that the ob­
served response time will be infinite. Bank two bases its pricing 
decisions on vsiriables other than the price chsurged or offered by 
other banks. Even though bank two does not respond to bank one's 
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price, it may ailter its price at some future date in response to 
other chamging conditions. Thus, violation of ceteris paribus con­
ditions will cause observed responses of nonrivals to be finite. 
Because both rivals and nonrivals may exhibit nonzero, but 
finite, response times, it is necesseiry to develop an empirical 
procedure that can identify significamt differences in finite 
response times. Standard statisticaLL methods offer such a pro­
cedure. 
Rationale for an Empirical Technique 
The basic assumptions of the empirical market delineation pro­
cedure cire that banks can be classified into two groups, riveils and 
nonrivals, and that the average response time between nonrivals is 
significantly greater than the average response time between rivals. 
For example, let represent a sample of response times drawn from 
a response time population of rivaJ. banks. Then the sample 
meeoi, is an estimate of the average response time for rival banks. 
Now let My represent a sangle of response times drawn from two un­
classified banks, and My the average response time of those banks. 
If My is significantly greater than the two banks cam be clas­
sified as nonrivauLs aind be included in sepsirate markets. If is 
not significamtly greater than M^, the two banks can be classified 
as rivals amd be included in the same market. 
The statisticaJL adaptation also assumes that exogenous factors 
other thcin action by a rivail aire randomly amd identically distributed 
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over both classes of banks. Differences in response times among 
rival banks viiich are used to generate the distribution of response 
times for rivals will be caused by changes in factors other than 
rival prices. Those same "other factors" will impact unclassified 
banks as well. The statisticail model assumes that the mean response 
time of rivals will be shorter than the mean response time of non-
rivals. The effect of exogenous influences on response time will 
be reflected in the stsmdard deviations of response times and thus 
become a part of the significance test. 
The Statistical Techniques 
Any statistical technique that evaJ-uates the significance of 
differences in measures of central tendency is a candidate for use 
in the delineation procedure. The theory outlined above discussed 
differences in the mean response times of different classes of banks. 
However, because there is no information on the form of the under­
lying distributions of response times, it is most appropriate to 
use a nonpaorametric technique. A nonpaorametric hypothesis does not 
involve the population parameters, but is concerned with the form 
of the population frequency distribution. Nonparametric techniques 
make it possible to test two or more samples to see if they have 
been drawn from a common distribution, without necessitating the 
staindard assumptions regarding the form of the distribution. Two 
types of nonpar ametric methods are used in this study. 
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The Wilcoxon-Maim-Whitnev test 
One nonpaxametric method used in this study to distinguish 
differences in mean response times tests for level (or location) 
differences between two populations aoid is referred to as the 
Wilcoxon-Maim-Whitney (MWM) test (Fryer, 1966, pp. 190-193). The WMW 
test is useful in testing hypotheses regarding the mean response 
time of an individual pair of unclassified banks vs. the mean 
response time of the overall rival sample. The WMW test normally 
is a one-tailed test with the hypotheses Ho; [F(X^) = G(X2)] 
versus Ha; [F(X^) > G(Xg)] for all points along the X scale of 
measurement, where F and G aire the cumulative distribution func­
tions for X^ and X^ respectively. The test is based upon the 
general assumption that, if the magnitude of the size of the X^*s 
is greater than the magnitude of the size of the X^'s, and if one 
draws random samples and of sizes n^ and n^ from the X^ and 
Xg populations, respectively, the x^'s in the combined axray of 
x^*s amd x^'s should outrank the x^' s. 
Specifically, one forms an ordered airray for the combined 
samples of x^'s amd x^* s and computes the vairiate: 
n,i(n, + 1) 
(1) U = n^n^ + 1 - T, 
where T is the sum of the ranks of the x^'s in the combined array. 
The variable U has an approximately normatl frequency distribution 
with a true mean of; 
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and a true variance of: 
(3) AG 
nin^Cni+n^+l) 1 2^ 1 
12 
Thus, the sangling variate 
(4) \ = 
U - (n^n^)/2 
1 
has a N(0, 1) frequency distribution, and Ho cam be tested with 
the use of the cumulative standard normal, distribution tables. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test 
The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test for two independent samples 
has been extended to the problem of analyzing more them two in­
dependent samples, by Wall is and Roberts (Wallis and Roberts, 1956, pp. 
583-621). The experimental situation is one vdiere k sanples have 
been obtained, with one sample being drawn from each of k possibly 
different populations. The objective is to test the null hypothesis 
that cull of the sangles have been drawn from ctn identiceil population 
against the aJLternative hypothesis that some of the samples have 
been drawn from different populations. In other words, one can 
test the null hypothesis that all of the populations possess observed 
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values of similar magnitudes, against the alternative hypothesis 
that some of the populations may possess observed values of dif­
fering magnitudes. The Kruskal-Wallis test is particularly use­
ful as a tool for testing vairious collections of rival bank pairs 
so as to generate a valid overall rival sample. Specifically, if 
there are k samples, of sizes n^, n^, ..., n^, a total of N in 
all samples, all N observations are ranked, and the sums of the 
ranks, R^, R^, •••» R^, are computed for the separate samples. 
Then one cam compute the varia te 
can be cailculated in order to approximate the probability of the 
variate H. Alternatively, the calculated value K can be compared 
to critical K values obtained from a cumulative standard normal 
distribution table. 
The standard normal variable 
51 
CHAPTER V. AN EMPIRICAL ILLUSTRATION OF 
THE DELINEATION PROCEDURE 
The purpose of this chapter is to apply the statisticeul method­
ology, presented in Chapter IV, to the basic hypothesis underlying 
the procedure for bamk maorket delineation. The hypothesis, wiiich 
was stated in Chapter IV, is concerned with viiether or not pairs of 
unclassified or spatially located banks bdtiave differently than an 
overaJLl sample of rival bsinks. Specifically, if the mean response 
time for an unclassified pair of banks is significauntly greater 
than the mean response time for an overall sample of rival banks, 
then the two unclassified banks are classified as nonrivaJL banks 
cind are included in separate mairkets. Conversely, if the meein re­
sponse time for an unclassified pair of baiîks is significantly less 
than or egucil to the mean response time for an overall sample of 
rival banks, the two unclassified banks sore classified as rivals 
and aire included in the same market. Using this methodology, any 
number of spatially separated banks can be assigned to their respec­
tive geographical maorket aireas. 
Research Design 
The measurement variable 
As stated in Chapter III, the vaoriable chosen for measurement, 
is the amount of time elapsed between any change in the input price 
of bank one, and a chainge in the input price of bamk two. It should 
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be emphasized that the measurement variable is calculated within 
bank pairs. Since the theoretical model elaborated in Chapter III 
was exclusively concerned with the input side of the market, only 
input prices have been selected for measurement. Several categories 
of bank input prices have been chosen. These categories include: 
passbook savings accounts; three-, six-, or nine-month certificates 
of deposit; one-year certificates of deposit; one to two and one-half 
year certificates of deposit; aoid two and one-half to four year 
certificates of deposit. Fortunately, these categories of input 
prices (deposits) were reasonably homogeneous across the bemks 
chosen for survey. Homogeneity across banks is guaranteed by 
federal regulations pertaining to characteristics of time deposit 
accounts. It is possible, of course, that markets defined by using 
time deposit rates may be different from those that would be defined 
by using loan rates or other criteria. 
Data collection procedure 
Data on chatnges in time deposit rates during 1960-75 were col­
lected from sixteen banks in Iowa. All banks are unit banks and 
none are associated with a holding company. Microdata from nine 
bemks in four towns were initially selected to potentially generate 
the riveul sample. Three of the nine bamks are located in a town of 
26,900 people, two axe located in a town of 12,600 people, two are 
located in a town of 4,500 people and two aire located in a town of 
3,200 people. 
Data from seven additional uncla.ssified banks in the area were 
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used to test the delineation procedure. Two of the seven unclassi­
fied baoiks aire located in a town of 3,200 people, and the other 
five are located in four towns raaiging in size from 370 to 2,300 
people. All the unclassified banks aire located within a radius of 
fifteen miles. 
A single-page mail survey with personal follow-up was used to 
collect date-of-change data from each bank. A copy of the question­
naire used in the survey is provided in Appendix A. Although some 
banks expressed difficulty in completing the survey, others indi­
cated that the data were readily avad-lable from minutes of board of 
directors* meetings or posting ledgers for active time-deposit ac­
counts. 
Calculation of response times 
In determining the response times for the rival or spaceless 
sample, the number of days that elapsed from the date of rate change 
by the lead bank and a rate change in the same deposit category by 
the rival was calculated. Because interest rates were relatively 
stable prior to the 1960-75 period, any initiad price changes in 
the sample were assumed to indicate lead bank price initiatives. 
The originaJ. lead banks, however, did not necessaurily remain the 
price leaders throughout the time period. 
To separate price responses between banks that are due to inter­
dependent pricing functions from price responses that aire due to 
changes in exogenous pairameters, the data cailculation was conducted 
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according to two different procedures. The first procedure was the 
imposition of a 365-day limitation on response time. If the elapsed 
time between price changes exceeded 365 days, the response time was 
specified as 365 days, and any subsequent rate change by any rival 
bank was designated as a new lead. The second procedure was the im­
position of a 180-day limitation on response time. If the elapsed 
time between price chsmges exceeded 180 days, the response time was 
specified as 180 days and agadn any subsequent rate change by any 
rival bank was designated as a new lead. Under both procedures, 
only rate changes within the same deposit category were considered 
as legitimate responses. Furthermore, any rate change within the 
same category, even if rates were not equalized, was considered as 
a response. 
Next, response times for the unclassified or spatial banks were 
determined. The response time for an unclassified bank pair was cal­
culated as the elapsed time in days from the date of change for the 
unclassified lead bank and the date of response by the other un­
classified bahke Other rules for a legitimate response were the 
same as for the rival sample. 
Identification of the rival sample 
In Chapter III, spaceless banks were assumed to be the same as 
rival banks, i.e., they were assumed to be one and the same, provided 
any degree of product differentiation within the rival or spaceless 
bcink pairs is not so great as to include the banks in separate 
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mcirkets. In the empiricsJ. adaptation, the rival or spaceless banks 
aire taken to be banks located within the same city. Since the sample 
was drawn from a collection of relatively smsuLl towns, this assump­
tion closely approximates reaJ-ity. Most of the riveJ. banks axe 
located merely a few city blocks ^axt, thus virtually negating any 
transportation costs between them. 
To generate a sample of rival ox spaceless banks, it is hypothe­
sized that it is possible to pool the response times within rival 
bank pairs across different towns. As stated earlier, nine banks 
located in four towns were chosen for survey as potenticd. rivals. 
Three of the banks are located in one town and shall be designated 
as banks A, B, and C. Two of the remaining six banks are located 
in a second town and shsJLl be designated as banks D and E. Two more 
are located in a third town and shall be designated as banks F and 
G. The final two banks axe located in a fourth town and axe desig­
nated as banks H and I, The xesponse times wexe calculated fox each 
of the six rival bank pairs, AB, AC, EC, DE, FG, and HI, under each 
of the procedurail assumptions pertadning to response time. The pro­
cedural assumptions were a 365-day limitation on response time, amd 
a 180-day limitation on response time. The data are presented in 
Tables B.l and B.2 in Appendix B. 
The Kruskal-Wallis test, presented in Chapter IV, was conducted 
on vaarious combinations of rival bank pairs to determine wàiich com­
binations can be vatlidly pooled to generate the rival sample. The 
test was conducted on the combination of adl six rival bank pairs. 
56 
all possible combinations of any five of the six baink pairs, and 
eJ.1 possible combinations of amy four of the six bank pairs. In 
addition, the test was conducted on all such combinations, for each 
of the procedural assumptions pertaining to response time limitations. 
The calculated results are presented in Tables B.3 and B.4 of Appendix B. 
Ihe null hypothesis pertaining to these caJLculations, is that 
all samples (pairs) in each combination of bank pairs have been 
drawn from an identical population. The alternative hypothesis is 
that some of the samples (pairs) in each combination have been 
drawn from different populations. Consequently, it is best to use a 
two-tailed test. The caûLculated K values, as described in Chapter 
IV, can be compared to critical K values obtained from a cumulative 
standard normal distribution table. A significance level of 10 
percent has been selected because of the relatively small sample 
size. Consequently the critical K value obtained from the standard 
normal distribution table pertaining to a two-tailed test is approxi­
mately 1.65. 
For the 365-day limitation on response time, the only bemk pair 
combination vàiich has a K value less than 1.65 is the combination 
EC, DE, FG, and HI. The calculated K veilue for this combination is 
1.48. Consequently, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that these 
bank pairs have been drawn from a common distribution. At the 10 
percent level of significance, this combination of bank pairs con­
stitutes a valid pool of rivail response times. The remaining com­
binations of bank pairs, under the 365-day limitation on response 
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time, yield calculated K values exceeding the criticstl vaJLue, 1.65, 
This leads to the rejection of the null hypothesis that they are 
all drawn from a common distribution. Instead, the alternative 
hypothesis that one or more of the pairs come from a different dis­
tribution, is accepted. The economic rationale underlying this 
hypothesis, is that some of the bank pairs possess a degree of prod­
uct differentiation viiich is high enough to warrant their exclusion 
from a common rival sample. 
For the 180-day limitation on response time, two bank pair 
combinations yield calculated K vatlues of less than 1.65. Combina­
tion AB, BC, FG, and HI yields a K vsuLue of 1.61, and combination 
AC, DE, FG, and HI yields a K value of .93. The null hypothesis 
cannot be rejected for either case, and both combinations are taken 
to constitute valid overauLl samples of rival bank pairs. The re­
maining combinations of bank pairs, under the 180-day limitation 
on response time, yield calculated K values that are greater than 
1.65. Consequently, for these remaining combinations, the null 
hypothesis must be rejected, and it cemnot be concluded that these 
bcmk pairs have been drawn from a common distribution. 
In summary, these preliminsory tests on various combinations 
of rival bank pairs have generated three valid oversLLl rival saijç>les. 
The first is the combination BC, DE, FG, and HI viàiich was ccilculated 
under the 365-day response time limitation. The second and third 
are the combinations AB, BC, FG, and HI; and AC, DE, FG, and HI 
vdiich were calculated under the 180-day response time limitation. 
58 
Each of these overall rival samples provides a base for compaxisons 
with pairs of unclassified or spatially located banks. 
Results 
The next step of the delineation procedure is to test each of 
the unclassified, or spatially located, baidc paiirs against each of 
the rivsuL samples. Specifically, the test consists of determining 
whether there is a significant difference between the response times 
within pairs of unclassified or spatially located banks and the 
response times within the pairs of spaceless banks comprising the 
rival samples. 
The seven unclassified banks axe all located within adjacent 
trade or customer eireas. Two of the banks axe located in one town, 
and are designated as banks H and I- It should be noted that these 
two banks also comprised part of the initial sanple of rival or 
spaceless banks. The reason they are treated as spatial or un­
classified banks in this second sample, is that the two banks axe 
now being treated as one unit. Specifically, banks H and I in the 
spatial sample, will not be tested against each other as was the 
case for the spaceless or rival sample, but instead shall be tested 
against other spatieully located banks. They are treated as one 
unit in the sense that only the first of the two banks to make a 
price adjustment is recorded. Another two of the spatially located 
banks axe located in one town and shall be designated as banks K 
and L. The remaining three spatially located banks are located in 
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three separate towns, and shall be designated as banks J, M, and N. 
The calculated response times for each of the unclassified, or 
spatially located, bank pairs are listed in Tables 5.1 and 5.2 ac­
cording to the procedural assumptions of a 365-day limitation on 
response time, and a 180-day limitation on response time respective­
ly. 
The pairs of unclassified, or spatially located, banks were 
tested against each of the rival sajmples by use of the Wilcoxon-
Mann-Whitney test. The Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test, described in 
Chapter IV, is specifically designed to determine if two samples 
have been drawn from a common distribution. The null hypothesis as­
sociated with the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test is that the response 
times within the unclassified bank pairs tend to be less than or 
equal to the response times within bank pairs comprising the rival 
samples. The alternative hypothesis is that the response times 
within the unclassified bank padLrs tend to be greater than the 
response times within the bank pairs comprising the rival sample. 
These types of hypotheses dictate the use of a one-tailed test. 
The one-tailed test, and the hypothesis structure just described 
have been selected because of the underlying economic intuition. 
The economic theory presented in Chapter III implies that the price 
reactions between spatially located, or unclassified, banks mi^t 
not be as large as the price reactions between spaceless or rival 
banks. This intuition was extended to a dynamic analysis where the 
length of time elapsed between price changes became the vauriable of 
Table 5,1. Calculated response times for unclassified banks, in days, using a 365-day 
limitation on response time 
(Kor L) 
J to to M to N to J to M to N to 
(Horl) (Horl) (Horl) (H or I) J to M (Kor L) J to N (Kor L) M to N (Kor L) 
365 365 365 365 0 6 365 0 0 365 
122 365 365 365 365 72 365 365 0 365 
365 40 365 18 365 365 365 365 14 365 
137 23 12 365 365 160 365 20 31 51 
12 33 365 365 0 20 31 0 73 9 
365 365 365 365 0 0 0 365 357 0 
51 365 365 13 365 11 365 365 365 365 
63 365 365 12 37 365 319 365 365 5 
31 174 365 365 19 10 6 365 365 20 
7 365 59 365 62 40 19 0 365 
8 365 365 365 9 
34 365 365 365 0 
365 26 192 9 365 
365 185 13 82 365 
365 60 12 5 
365 20 
40 
194 
33 
Table 5.2. Calculated response times for unclassified banks, in days, using a 180-day 
limitation on response time 
(Kor L) 
J to to M to N to J to M to N to 
(Horl) (Horl) (Horl) (Horl) J to M (Kor L) J to N (Kor L) M to N (Kor L) 
180 180 180 180 0 0 180 0 180 180 
112 180 180 180 180 72 180 180 31 180 
180 40 180 180 180 180 180 180 0 180 
137 23 12 180 180 160 180 20 180 51 
180 33 180 18 0 20 31 0 180 9 
12 180 180 180 0 0 0 180 0 0 
180 180 180 180 180 11 180 180 180 180 
51 180 180 180 37 180 180 180 180 5 
63 174 180 180 29 10 180 180 14 20 
180 180 59 13 62 40 5 0 73 180 
7 8 180 12 19 180 9 
34 180 180 180 0 
180 26 180 9 180 
180 180 180 82 180 
180 180 180 5 
180 60 180 20 
40 180 
180 180 
180 13 
33 12 
o\ 
H 
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measurement. Hie resulting implication is that the length of 
response time between price chaoiges for spatisJLly located banks 
might be of a greater magnitude than the length of response time 
between price changes for spaceless banks. The economic rationale 
for these implications, is that spatial banks, due to customer 
transportation costs, often enjoy a cushion agaiinst price rivailry. 
To maintain consistency with the previous statistical analysis, 
a significance level of 10 percent has been selected. Becs.use of 
the employment of a one-tailed test, a 10 percent level of signifi­
cance yields a critical X value of 1.28. The X statistic, described 
in Chapter IV, was assumed to be normally distributed and conse­
quently the criticeJ. \ value can be obtained from a standard normal 
distribution table. 
The cailculated T, U, and \ values pertauLning to the ten possible 
pairings of unclassified, or spaceless banks are presented in Tables 
5.3, 5.4, aind 5.5. The values presented in Table 5.3 axe the result 
of cailculations conducted on response times calculated under the 365-
day limitation. Each pair of unclassified banks has been tested 
against the sangle BC, DE, FG, and HI, vàiich is the overatll sample 
of rival bank pairs generated under the 365-day limitation on re­
sponse time. The values presented in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 are the re­
sult of calculations conducted on response times calculated under 
the 180-day limitation. As a consequence, two sets of results are 
obtained. Table 5.4 presents the results obtaiined by testing each 
pair of unclassified banks against the overall rival sample AB, 
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Table 5.3. Calculated T, U, and X values for unclassified bank 
pairs with a 365-day limitation on response time. 
The rival bank paiir combination used as the compari­
son sample is AB, AC, DE, HI 
Unclassified ^ ^ 
bank comparisons 
J to (H or I) 356.5 159.5 1.58 
(K or L) to (H or I) 881.5 201.5 3.47 
M to (H or I) 700 125 3.74 
N to (H or I) 641 184 2.77 
J to M 317 108 .57 
J to (K or L) 296 229 .12 
J to N 379.5 145.5 1.88 
M to (K or L) 532 231 1.68 
M to N 297.5 170.5 .91 
N to (K or L) 573.5 314.5 .97 
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Table 5.4. Cadculated T, U, and X values for unclassified bank 
pairs with a 180-day limitation on response time. 
The rivaJL bsmk pair combination used as the compaii-
son sample is AC, DE, FG, HI 
Unciass ified 
bank comparisons T U X 
J to (H or I) 375 219 .88 
(K or L) to (H or I) 821.5 348.5 1.77 
M to (H or I) 667 237 2.28 
N to (H or I) 840 330 2.01 
J to M 267 268 .58 
J to (K or L) 241 294 1.11 
J to N 375 219 .88 
M to (K or L) 462 315 .35 
M to N 301 234 .12 
N to (K or L) 494 410 .40 
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Table 5.5. Calculated T, U, and X vailues fox unclassified bank 
pairs with a 180-day limitation on response time. 
The rivaJ. bank pair combination used as the compari­
son sample is AB, BC, FG, HI 
Unclass ified 
bank compairisons 
J to (H or I) 440 264 .90 
(K or L) to (H or I) 976 394 2.13 
M to (H or I) 788 276 2.47 
N to (H or I) 983 387 2.21 
J to M 320 315 .43 
J to (K or L) 283 352 1.07 
J to N 448 256 1.03 
M to (K or L) 544 373 .47 
M to N 360.5 274.5 .26 
N to (K or L) 574 490 .34 
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BC, FG, and HI. Table 5.5 presents the restilts obtained by testing 
each of the unclassified bank pairs against the overaill rival 
sample AC, DB-, FG, and HI. 
The statistic of interest is the test statistic, X ,  viiich can 
be compared to the critical X value of 1.28. The calculated X values 
aire again presented in Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3, according to their 
respective conditions of calculation. These figures also provide 
the geographicaLL structure for the unclassified banks. Calculated 
X values greater than the critical vaJ-ue of 1.28 lead one to reject 
the null hypothesis that the unclassified, or spatiadly located, 
bank pair in question, tends to have response times less than or 
equcil to the response times exhibited by the overall sample of rival 
bankso Instead, one must accept the alternative hypothesis that the 
unclassified bank pair in question tends to demonstrate response 
times that cire greater than the response times resulting from the 
overall sample of rival banks. Calculated X values less tham the 
critical value of 1.28 indicate that one cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the unclassified, or spatially located, bank pair 
in question tends to have response times less than or equal to the 
response times yielded by the overall sample of rival banks. 
The assumption basic to the delineation procedure, is that any 
two banks comprising an unclassified bank paiir that does not demon­
strate significantly greater response times, at the 10 percent level 
of significance, than the overall sample of rival banks, axe con­
sidered to behave as rival bamks aind should be included in the same 
3.74 
57 
3.47 
1.58 
12 
I 
1.88 
97 
2.77 
Roads 
Figure 5.1. \ values for unclassified bank pairs with a 365-day 
limitation on response time 
2.28 
H & I \ 
1.77 
1.11 ^ 
K & L 
2.01 
o> 
00 
Roads 
Figure 5.2. X values for unclassified bemk pairs with a 180-day 
limitation on response time. The rival bank pair 
combination used as the comparison sample is; AC, 
DE, FG, and HI 
2,47 
43 
2.13 
47 90 
1.07 
X\.\ & 
\1,03 
2.21 
Roads 
Figure 5.3. X  values for unclassified bank pairs with a 180-day 
limitation on response time. The rival bank pair 
combination used as the comparison sample is: AB, 
BC, FG, and HI 
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market. Conversely, any two banks comprising an unclassified bank 
pair that does demonstrate significaintly greater response times, 
at the 10 percent level of significance, than the overall sample of 
rival banks, axe not considered to behave as rival banks and should 
not be included in the same market» 
From Table 5.3 or Figure 5.1, wiiich represent values calculated 
under the 365-day limitation on response time, it can be seen that 
all bank pairs involving H or I reflect X values greater than 1.28. 
As a result, it can be concluded that banks H and I unambiguously 
must be included in a market area separate from the other banks in 
the survey. The results provided by the rest of the unclassified 
bank pairs cire not as conclusive. The bank pairs J to N and M to 
(K or L) yield X values greater than 1.28 and lead one to conclude 
that the banks comprising each pair do not behave as rivsuLs and 
consequently should be included in separate markets. The remaining 
unclassified pairs of banks yield X values less than 1.28, leading 
one to conclude that the banks comprising each bank pair behave as 
rivals and must be included in the same market. Because bank pairs 
J to N and M to (K or L) do not behave as rivals, it is not possible 
to conclude that banks J, N, M, K and L, aill belong in one market 
area. 
The values provided by Tables 5.4 and 5.5, amd Figures 5.2 and 
5.3, indicate slightly different results them those provided by 
Table 5.3 and Figure 5.1. The values in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 and 
Figures 5.2 and 5.3 have been calculated under the 180-day limitation 
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on response time, using overall rivaul samples AC, DE, FG, and HI; 
and AB, BC, FG, and HI respectively. It should be noted that the 
values calculated using these different rival samples, under the 180-
day limitation, provide results that axe consistent with each other. 
As a consequence, the discussion pertaining to the 180-day response 
time limitation can be generalized to cover both sets of results. 
All but one of the bank pairs involving (H or I) yield X values 
greater thsm 1.28. The exception is the pair J to (H or I). This 
pair has associated X values of .88 and .90 pertaining to rival com­
binations AC, DE, FG, and HIj and AB, BC, FG, and HI, respectively. 
The conclusion derived from these results is that banks M, N, and 
(K or L) belong in a different market axea from banks (H or I). 
Bank J, on the other hand, should be included in the same market 
area as bamks (H or I). The remaining unclassified bank pairs 
yield X values that axe less than 1.28 leading one to conclude that 
they all behave as rivals and should, therefore, be included in a 
common market axea. 
Discussion of Results 
An apparent point of inconsistency resulting from the above 
2inaJ.ysis demonstrates the need for further discussion of the method­
ology. Under the 180-day limitation on response time, bank J has 
been shown to behave as a rival both when con^ared to banks (H or I ), 
and also when compaired to the other unclassified banks in the survey. 
However, banks (H or I) have been shown not to behave as a rival 
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combination vàien compeared to the other unclassified banks in the 
survey. There are several possible answers to this sgppsirent prob­
lem of intransitivity. First, the sample sizes may be insuffi­
ciently small. As can be seen from Tables 5.1 and 5.2, the samples 
of unclassified bank pairs range in size from 10 observations ta, at 
most, 20 observations. It may be possible, that by increasing the 
sample sizes, either by increasing the time period of the survey, 
or by initially selecting banks that are more price active, any 
problem of intremsitivity mi^t be eliminated. A second solution 
to the intrsmsitivity problem might lie in more experimentation with 
the appropriate limitation on response time. The problem of viiether 
to include bank J in the same maorket as banks (H or I), does not 
arise with the 365-day response time limitation. Other inconsisten­
cies arise, however, involving bank pairs J to N and M to (K or L). 
The point is that there is nothing absolute about the choice of 
365 days or 180 days as the limitation on response time. Further 
testing might yield a response time limitation that would provide 
more consistent results. The third answer to the aç>parent problem 
of in transitivity might lie in sm examination of the economic in­
tuition underlying the delineation procedure. Specifically, one 
must be caoreful not to over interpret the results provided by the 
methodology. The data used in this study consist of response times 
related to input price changes within pairs of banks. Any or all 
price changes within the appropriate input price categories chosen, 
have been recorded. The price changes have not been broken down 
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according to their initiating causes. Generally a price change is 
due to one, or both, of two major causes. First, a price change 
may be the result of factors internal to the bank. A bank may ex­
perience increased efficiency and hence decreased operating costs 
wiiich enable it to alter the prices paid to its factors of produc­
tion (depositors). Another internal factor leading to a price 
change mi^t be a change of attitude on behalf of the bank's manage­
ment, e.g., it might decide to become more aggressive with its 
pricing policies. The second major cause, underlying a change in 
prices, is that of changing market conditions, e.g., a change in 
customer incomes or tastes. These axe changes exogenous to the bemk, 
but nevertheless they will provoke price adjustments. The point of 
contention, is that whether or not a bank responds to another's 
price initiative, or to viiat degree the bank responds, may depend 
on the initiating cause of the price response. 
Some other factors to consider axe whether or not spatially 
located banks behave as if they are spatially isolated. A spatially 
located bank may react to another's price initiative because of an 
even customer distribution between them, i.e., the banks will react 
to each other because each will attempt to protect its trade area. 
Conversely, some spatially located banks enjoy spatial isolation. 
There may be an uneven customer distribution that makes it unneces­
sary for one bank to react to another's price initiative, i.e., the 
trade area may be so spaorsely populated that it does not merit 
protection—at least at its outer fringe. 
74 
The final factor of consideration is viiether or not the banks 
axe influenced by similar market conditions. As stated before, 
maarket conditions refer to exogenous factors such as customer in­
comes and tastes. 
When a price initiative is the result of the internal policies 
of one bcink, the influence on the other bank's price response de­
pends strictly on the degree of spatial isolation. A bank's price 
response is strictly a move to protect its trade area from the 
other's price initiative. If market factors are constant, it does 
not matter vixether or not the two banks aire influenced by common 
market forces. 
When a price initiative is the result of changing maxket con­
ditions, the degree of price response depends on several factors. 
If two bajnks axe influenced by common market conditions, then both 
banks should adjust prices according to the changing market condi­
tions, regardless of their degree of spatial isolation. If two 
bcinks are influenced by different market conditions, then as the 
market conditions of one bank change idiile the mairket conditions of 
the other bank remain constant, any degree of price response be­
tween the banks depends on the degree of spatial isolation. If the 
banks are spatially isolated, there should be no price response. 
If the two banks aire not spatially isolated, then there should be 
some degree of price response, as the effects of a price initiative 
by one bsmk affect the trade airea boundary separating the two banks. 
It is an assumption of this study that price responses that eire the 
75 
result of changing market conditions are greater, and resultingly 
quicker, than price responses that result from changing internal 
factors aiffected through spatially effective trade aareas. 
This discussion may explain the cause of the intrauisitivity 
problem. The data were calculated for any price changes initiated 
for any reason, i.e., it is the composite of price changes initiated 
by both internal factors and market factors. The overall rival 
samples used as the basis for comparisons were generated by com­
bining banks that sire influenced by both similar market conditions 
and a spaceless geographic distribution. As a result, the calculated 
price responses were virtually complete, and were initiated very 
quickly. The reason the price responses were not instantaneous can 
be ascribed to a degree of product differentiation. When the pairs 
of unclassified, or spatially located, banks axe compared to this 
overall rival sample, the acceptance of the alternative hypothesis 
that the unclassified bank pairs yield significantly greater response 
times indicates one or both of two possibilities. The unclassified, 
or spatially located, banks may be spatially isolated from each 
other; the unclassified banks may be influenced by separate market 
factors; or the unclassified banks may be affected by a combination 
of both factors. As a consequence, the statistical results must be 
interpreted carefully. 
For example, under the 180-day response time limitation, it was 
found that banks (H or I) did not belong in the same market airea as 
banks (K or L). However, bank J appeared to exist in the market 
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area of both bank pairs (H or I) and (K or L). A reason for this 
apparent inconsistency is that bank J might possess common market 
factors with one of the bank pairs, and possess uncommon market 
factors, but a spatiauLly effective trade axea with the other pair 
of banks. Suppose bank J is influenced by market factors common 
to banks (K or L). The statistical anaJLysis would reveal bank J 
and banks (K or L) to behave as riveJLs and indicate that they should 
be included in similar markets. Now suppose bank J and bsinks (H or 
I) are not influenced by common market factors, but axe linked by 
a spatially effective trade aorea. The statistics might also reveal 
bsink J and banks (H or I) to behave as rivails, and indicate that 
they should also belong in similar maarkets. But because price re­
sponses are assumed to be less extensive when they axe the result 
of spatially effective trade areas than viien they result from com­
mon market factors, it is entirely possible that the statistics 
will not reveail banks (H or I) and (K or L) to behave as rivals. 
This stems from the fact that the price responses used in this study 
aire taken as a composite, and aore not broken down according to their 
underlying causes. This discussion may provide an intuitive answer 
as to vh.y the problem of intransitivity exists, but it has not pro­
vided a solution—other than to suggest a more extensive statistical 
analysis. 
There are two approaches to the intramsitivity problem, however, 
that may preclude amy further statistical anaulysis. The first, is 
that it may be unnecessary, if not impossible, to construct actual 
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geographical market axea boundaries. An effective maorket area, in 
reality, is not necessarily an either/or situation, but a matter of 
degree. It has been the objective of the statistical analysis used 
in the project, to determine the extent of the degree of price re­
sponse, by calculating the associated X values and their underlying 
probabilities. 
The second approach to the intransitivity problem is an exten­
sion of what has ailready been done. This approach, however, requires 
the establishment of a "market center" or an amchoring town, which 
becomes the base for the statistical tests (Cochrane, 1957, p. 26), 
The purpose of establishing a market center, or anchor, is to prevent 
the formation of indefinite chains of trade areas falling into one 
msurket area. The choice of a market center is someisàiat arbitrary. 
A logical choice, for the purposes of this project, is the largest 
town in the survey of unclassified banks. This choice can be justi­
fied on the basis that the largest town tends to attract the largest 
volume of customers, and at least from an arbitrary perspective, 
should wield the most influence. The laorgest town in the survey of 
unclassified bamks is the town of 3,200 people. This town contains 
the banks H and I, As a result, the relevant statistical tests for 
the survey of unclassified banks are the tests that include banks 
(H or I), These tests, which can be designated as the primary tests, 
auce J to (H or I), (K or L) to (H or I), M to (H or I), said N to 
(H or I). The tests pertaining to the remaining pairs of unclassi­
fied banks aire designated as secondary tests, amd do not influence 
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the results or implications of the primary tests. 
For the 365-day limitation on response time, all of the primary 
tests yield caLLculated X values greater than the critical value of 
1.28. As a result, banks (H or I) sire included in a market area 
that is separate from the other unclassified bairiks in the survey. 
For the 180-day limitation on response time, the primary tests per­
taining to all bank pairs except J to (H or I), yield X values great­
er than 1.28. As a consequence, baiiks J and banks (H or I) are in­
cluded in a common market airea that is sepaarate from the other un­
classified banks in the survey. Thus the market center approach 
provides a method of dealing with any problems of intransitivity 
that might arise from the statistical analysis. Whether to use the 
mairket center approach, or to use a direct interpretation of the cal­
culated X values, depends on the goals of any subsequent studies that 
might erçloy the use of the delineation procedure. If the goal re­
quires the calculation of measures of concentration, then the market 
center approach is paurtictilarly useful in delineating an actual 
market area. If the goal is satisfied by just examining the degrees 
of interdependence, then sufficient information is provided by an 
interpretation of the X values themselves. 
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CHAPTER VI. œNCLUSIONS 
The accurate delineation of geographical banking markets is 
an importsoit aspect of the analysis of structure-conduct-performance 
relationships regarding the commercial, banking industry. In addi­
tion, any analysis of existing or proposed regulations pertaining 
to price rivalry in commerciatl banking requires the delineation of 
geographical banking maarkets as a prerequisite. Virtually all 
studies concerning the structure-conduct-performance relationships 
of the commercial bsmking industry measure structure in the form 
of some type of concentration measure, e.g., the concentration 
ratio, the concentration table, etc, A concentration measure must 
be based on an economically relevant geographical mairket area if it 
is to be an accurate measure of maarket structure. Too often 
structure-conduct-performance studies simply avoid the problem of 
appropriate market area delineation by using political aoreas such 
as the county or the state as the mairket areas on wfoich to base 
the concentration measures. There is little reason, however, to 
believe that such political areas necessaorily represent economically 
valid market aareas. 
There are sever ail geographical delineation procedures in exis­
tence. However, most of these procedures axe designed to delineate 
trade areas rather thaoi market aireas. Trade aireas represent the 
actual customer areas pertaining to each individual firm or bank. 
Maurket areas, on the other hand, represent areas containing firms 
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or banks that axe influenced by common competitive forces. Some 
examples of trade area delineation techniques are ençïiricaJ. tech­
niques such as customer spotting and license plate analysis, amd 
theoreticcLl techniques such as the gravitational method and the 
economic law of market aoreas. The trade areas delineated by these 
procedures are not necessarily coincident with the market areas 
needed as the basis for vêilid concentration measures. 
A method that is theoretically appealing as a market delinea­
tion procedure is the cross-price elasticity method. Unfortunately 
this method is difficult to implement empirically. Often the data 
necessary to perform the calculation of cross-price elasticities are 
unavailable. Furthermore, because of the static nature of cross-
price elasticities, the statistical results are difficult to inter­
pret. In summation, there is a strong need for an operational method 
for the delineation of economicaully relevant geographical banking 
markets. It has been the purpose of this project to develop such 
a method. 
Ihe economic theory underlying the delineation procedure was 
developed in Chapter III. A two-bank oligopsony model was developed 
for each of two categories of banks. The first category was 
designated as the spaceless baink case viiere transportation costs 
between the two bainks in the model were assumed to be zero and thus 
were not a factor in the model. The second category was designated 
as the spatial bank case where transportation costs between the two 
banks in the model were assumed to be nonzero aind thus were a factor 
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in the model. The decision variables for both the spaceless and 
spatial bank cases were the bank input prices. In the spaceless 
case, each bank*s input supply function contains both its own in­
put price and the input price of its rivail. In the spatial case, 
each bank's input supply function contains its own input price and 
a vaariable representing its trade area boundsury. The variable rep­
resenting each bank's trade area boundary was assumed to be a func­
tion of the input prices paid by each bank. Price-price reaction 
functions for both the spaceless and the spatial categories of banks 
were developed. Next, the slopes of the reaction functions per­
taining to each case were developed to show how each baink, assuming 
it is a profit maximizer, must adjust its input price in response 
to its rival's price initiative. It is hypothesized that the 
reaction function slopes will be greater for the spaceless banks 
them for the spatial banks, i.e., profit maximizing spaceless banks 
are apt to make a more complete price adjustment to a rival ' s price 
initiative than would profit maximizing spatial banks. The reason 
for this hypothesis is that spaceless banks must compete for a com­
mon set of geographical customers. The spatial bamks, on the other 
hand, compete only for the geographically marginal customers. 
To facilitate ençîiricaJ. adaptation of the theoretical analysis, 
the model was modified to accommodate a dynamic framework. Accord­
ingly, the amount of time elapsed between bemk input price adjust­
ments was adopted as the variable of measurement. The empirical 
adaptation establishes a two-category scheme for bank classification. 
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rivals and nonrivaJLs. Rivads aire banks that, due to product simi-
laarity aoad a small degree of spatial isolation, respond to each 
other's pricing adjustments and are thus in the same market. Those 
spaceless banks possessing an insignificant degree of product dif­
ferentiation were hypothesized to behave as rival banks. Nonrivals 
are banks that, due to dissimilar market conditions or a Isorge 
degree of spatial isolation, do not respond to each other's pricing 
adjustments and axe thus in separate markets. The spatial banks, 
since they represent the test banks, were renamed unclassified 
banks, and could ultimately be determined to be either rivals or 
nonrivals. If the degree of spatial isolation is insignificant, 
then the relev.mt unclassified banks can be classified as rivals. 
But if the degree of spatial isolation has a significant impact on 
behavior, then the relevant unclassified banks may be classified 
as nonrivals. The statistical adaptation of the theory is based 
on the assumption that the response time of a bank to a nonrival's 
price change will be significantly greater than the response time 
of that same bank to a rival's price change. 
Data on the amount of time elapsed between input price changes 
within pairs of banks were collected for several categories of bank 
input prices. These categories include passbook savings accounts 
and various certificates of deposit. The data were ccilculated ac­
cording to two different rules regarding response time limitation. 
The first rule was the imposition of a 365-day limitation on response 
time. If th»î elapsed time between price changes within a bank pair 
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exceeded 365 days, the response time was specified as 365 days, 
and any subsequent rate chaoige by either bank was designated as a 
new price lead. The second rule, was the imposition of a 180-day 
limitation on response time. If the elapsed time between price 
changes within a bank pair exceeded 180 days, the response time 
was specified as 180 days and any subsequent rate chamge by either 
bank was designated as a new price lead. 
The spaceless banks were designated to be bank pairs located 
within the same town. The Kruskal-Wallis test was conducted on 
nine spaceless banks, or six spaceless bank pairs, across four dif­
ferent towns to generate an overall sample of rival banks. The 
underlying intuition of the test is that because the towns are 
geographically separated, some of the rival bank pairs might possess 
differing degrees of product differentiation. The test was conducted 
for each of the rules regarding response time limitation, on numerous 
combinations of the spaceless bank pairs. The statistical results 
provide three different overall rival samples; one pertaining to the 
365-day response time limitation, and two pertaining to the 180-day 
response time limitation. These overaill rival samples provide the 
bases from vdiich to compaire the unclassified or spatially located 
bank pairs. 
Data from seven unclassified, or spatially located, bemks in 
five different towns, were collected for testing the delineation 
procedure. The pairs of unclassified banks were tested against 
each of the rival samples by use of the Wilcoxon-Mcinn-Whitney test. 
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The results of these tests provide vailuable information on the 
degrees of price rivalry within the pairs of unclassified banks. 
When the largest town was selected as a maarket center, or anchoring 
town, it was possible to separate the unclassified banks into their 
respective maarket areas. Thus the delineation technique has poten­
tial for use in evaluating the existence of price rivalry between 
banks, the competitive inpact of regulatory change, and the effect 
on price rivalry of proposed mergers. 
The procedure, however, is not without shortcomings. To use 
the procedure accurately, information on date-of-change in the ap­
propriate response variable, must be obtained. Such information 
may not be available in secondary data sources. In regulated in­
dustries such as banking, regulatory authorities could collect 
date-of-change data as part of their regular examinations. For 
other industries, personal interview or surveys may be required. 
However, the data needs of the methodology proposed here are modest 
in comparison to that required for the traditional cross-price elas­
ticity approach. 
In addition, the dates of price (rate) or nonprice changes for 
all firms (banks) must be obtained. For example, if rate change 
dates are missing or incomplete for one bank, it is impossible to 
determine in vftiich market that bsmk belongs. Also, the test is 
strongest for confirming that two banks are in separate markets. 
Acceptance of the null hypothesis that response times for unclassi­
fied banks are not significantly greater than those of rival banks 
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does not necessaucily meaai that the unclassified banks aire in the 
same market. However, acceptance of the alternative hypothesis 
that response times between unclassified banks axe s ignificantly 
different is a strong indication that the banks are not in the same 
market. 
Furthermore, because of potential problems of in transitivity, 
a market center must be specified to use as the base for the test. 
If this base is not used, elongated chains of rival bsmks may be 
identified and "gray aireas" between well-defined market areas may 
arise. 
The quantification of long delays or, essentially, nonresponses 
also presents difficulties. Although two different limitations—the 
365-day and 180-day rates—on response time were used in the test of 
the approach. Other rules for quantifying long delays may result 
in different numerical results. Also, only responses within the 
same deposit category were considered legitimate responses in the 
empirical test. If any change within the entire maturity structure 
was considered as a legitimate response, different results again 
might be obtained. 
In applying the delineation procedure to the banking industry, 
the choice of the time deposit rate variable as the response measure 
may result in problems. Althou^ time deposit categories are 
homogeneous by law across banks, rates on time deposits also axe 
highly regulated. In recent years, most banks have paid ceiling 
rates, and many banks have adjusted their rates when changes have 
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been made in the ceiling regulations. These exogenous, artificial 
ceiling regulations not only may impede competition, but also may 
confound the measurement of competitive responses and delineation 
of bank maorkets. Thus, other response measures such as a change in 
services or deposit maturities should be evaluated using the delinea­
tion methodology presented here. 
Finally, the proposed methodology focuses only on the speed of 
response and ignores the extent of response. It is likely that the 
magnitude of response is an important factor in the dynamics of firm 
interaction. Additional work is necessairy to incorporate response 
magnitude considerations. 
It has been the purpose of this project to develop a basic ap­
proach to the delineation of geographical banking market areas. Be­
cause of the pilot nature of this project, the research has been de­
veloped as a basic level. As a consequence, there is room for a good 
deal of future reseaorch related to refining the delineation procedure 
itself. For example, it might be possible to convert each response 
into a "compound equivailent" vàiere the compound equivalent is defined 
as the continuous rate of increase in the price variable necessaxy 
to achieve the actual change at the time of response. A laxger re­
sponse would result in a larger compound equivalent, and a longer 
delay in response would result in a smaller equivalent. Thus, the 
compound equivalent would capture the importance of both the magni­
tude and timing of responses and could be calculated and compared 
for rivals and unclassified firms. In addition, further research is 
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needed regarding the appropriate response-time limitation. Finally, 
research is needed to develop a method of sepaurating price responses 
that aire due to changing market conditions from price responses 
that are due to spatially effective trade aoreais. Once the procedure 
has been refined, it has numerous applications to future research 
related to the analysis of structure-conduct-performance relation­
ships. The delineation of economically relevsmt banking market 
sareas should result in the calculation of concentration measures 
that are more economically valid than those currently in use. As 
a consequence, the delineation procedure could have a significant 
impact on structure-conduct-performance relationships and the re­
sulting implications toward policy prescriptions. A good deal of 
future reseaorch is required to determine the extent of any such 
impact. 
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APPENDIX A; QUESTIONNAIRE 
92 
Would you please record your passbook Interest rate as veil as the interest rate 
on any of the listed certificates of deposit as of January 1. 1960. 
RATES PAID 
Date Passbook 3. 6 or 9 months 1 year 1-2*; years 2^ -4 years 
1/1/60 
Please list below by year, month, and day, the effective dates of change in any 
of these interest rates since January 1, 1960. Also, please list the corresponding 
new interest rates in the respective blanks. This information should be readily 
available from such sources as minutes of board of director's meetings or posting 
ledgers for active time-deposit accounts. 
NEW RATES 
Date of 
Change Passbook 3. 6, or 9 months 1 year l-2h years 2^ -4 years 
X-
Have you made a change from quarterly to daily compounding on passbook savings accounts? 
If so, please list the effective date of that change. 
Name 
Bank 
Figure A.l. Time deposit rate questionnaire 
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Would you please record your passbook interest rate as well as the interest rate 
on any of the listed certificates of deposit as of January 1. 1960. 
RATES PAID 
Date Passbook 3. 6 or 9 months 1 year 1-2^ years 2*g-4 years 
1/1/60 
Please list below by year, month, and day, the effective dates of change in any 
of these interest rates since January 1, 1960. Also, please list the corresponding 
new interest rates in the respective blanks. This information should be readily 
available from such sources as minutes of board of director's meetings or posting 
ledgers for active time-deposit accounts. 
NEW RATES 
Date of 
Change Passbook 3, 6, or 9 months 1 year 1-2% years 2%-4 years 
H 
Have you made a change from quarterly to daily compounding on passbook savings accounts? 
If so, please list the effective date of that change. 
Name 
Bank 
Figure A.1. Time deposit rate questionnaire 
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APPENDIX B: TABLES œNTAINING DATA AND RESULTS 
PERTAINING TO RIVAL BANKS 
L to 
120 
123 
365 
365 
61 
365 
30 
230 
20 
275 
61 
Calculated response times for rival banks, in days, while using a 365-day 
limitation on response time 
(A to C) (B to C) (D to E) (F to G) (H to I) 
105 14 58 14 213 
38 161 8 365 332 
365 216 14 3 1 
76 8 58 365 365 
183 14 8 4 365 
28 14 14 3 365 
365 161 307 15 31 
365 202 8 4 1 
28 8 14 162 213 
365 253 3 192 
41 14 31 
76 14 1 
161 
8 
8 
14 
L to 
120 
123 
180 
180 
61 
180 
30 
180 
20 
180 
180 
61 
30 
20 
33 
61 
Calculated response times for rival banks, in days, while using a 180-day 
limitation on response time 
(A to C) (B to C) (D to E) (F to G) (H to I) 
105 14 58 14 180 
38 161 8 180 180 
180 180 14 3 180 
76 8 58 180 180 
180 14 8 4 1 
28 14 14 3 180 
180 161 180 15 180 
180 180 180 4 31 
28 8 8 162 1 
180 180 14 3 180 
41 14 180 
76 14 180 
161 180 
8 180 
8 31 
14 1 
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Table B.3. Calculated H and K veLLues for classified banks with a 
180-day limitation on response time 
""SSîlS; saaple size H 
AB, AC, BC, DE, FG, HI 80 13.76 16.46 
AB, AC, BC, DE, FG 64 13.16 15.97 
AB, AC, BC, DB, HI 70 10.57 12.31 
AB, AC, BC, FG, HI 70 11.11 13.07 
AB, AC, DE, FG, HI 64 10.35 12.00 
AB, BC, DE, FG, HI 68 10.97 12.87 
AC, BC, DE, FG, HI 64 10.20 11.78 
AB, AC, BC, DE 54 10.10 12.04 
AB, AC, BC, FG 54 10.67 12.85 
AB, AC, DE, FG 48 10.75 12.96 
AB, BC, DE, FG 52 9.40 11.06 
AC, BC, DE, FG 48 8.30 9.49 
AB, AC, BC, HI 60 7.23 7.98 
AB, AC, DE, HI 54 6.00 6.24 
AB, BC, DE, HI 58 8.52 9.81 
AC, BC, DE, HI 54 7.89 8.92 
AB, AC, FG, HI 54 6.49 6.94 
AB, BC, FG, HI 58 2.72 1.61 
AC, BC, FG, HI 54 8.56 9.86 
AB, DB, FG, HI 52 8.42 9.67 
AC, DB, FG, HI 48 2.24 0.93 
BC, DE, FG, HI 52 6.01 6.26 
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Table B.4. Cadculated H and K values for classified banks with a 
365-day limitation on response time 
CoA:^tions of size „ K 
bank pairs 
AB, AC, BC, DE, FG, HI 70 13.78 16.49 
AB, AC, BC, DE, FG 58 15.14 18.77 
AB, AC, BC, DE, HI 60 12.43 14.94 
AB, AC, BC, FG, HI 61 12.97 15.70 
AB, AC, DE, FG, HI 54 10.32 11.95 
AB, BC, EE, PG, HI 58 12.40 14.90 
AC, BC, DE, PG, HI 59 12.03 14.37 
AB, AC, BC, DE 48 13.85 17.35 
AB, AC, BC, FG 49 11.20 13.60 
AB, AC, DE, FG 42 12.28 15.13 
AB, BC, DE, FG 46 12.95 16.07 
AC, BC, DE, FG 47 9.55 11.26 
AB, AC, BC, HI 51 7.61 8.52 
AB, AC, DE, HI 44 8.03 9.12 
AB, BC, DE, HI 48 8.90 10.35 
AC, BC, DE, HI 49 8.21 9.37 
AB, AC, FG, HI 45 4.85 4.62 
AB, BC, FG, HI 49 6.97 7.62 
AC, BC, PG, HI 50 6.74 7.29 
AB, DE, PG, HI 42 7.10 7.80 
AC, DE, FG, HI 43 6.94 7.57 
EC, DE, FG, HI 47 2.63 1.48 
